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Abstract: In this paper we compare the protability of a merger between two
rms (one rm fully acquires another) and the protability of a partial ownership
arrangement between the same two rms in which the acquiring rm obtains corpo-
rate control over the pricing decisions of the acquired rm. We nd that joint prot
can be higher in the latter case because it may result in a greater dampening of
competition with respect to an outside competitor. We also derive comparative sta-
tics on the prices of the acquiring rm, the acquired rm, and the outside rm and
use them to explain puzzling features of the pay-TV markets in Norway and Sweden.
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1 Introduction
There is a large literature on the protability of mergers between rms. In this
literature, the acquiring rm is assumed to have control over both the pricing and
the output decisions of the acquired rm (corporate control). There is also a large
literature on the protability of partial ownership arrangements. In this literature, it
is typically assumed that the acquiring rm does not obtain corporate control.1 Not
surprisingly, the two literatures have, for the most part, developed independently.
However, as emphasized by OBrien and Salop (2000), an acquiring rm may
achieve corporate control without having obtained a 100% ownership stake. They
show that when an acquiring rm has control over the acquired rms pricing deci-
sion, but less than a 100% ownership stake, the welfare e¤ects can be worse than
if the rms had merged. In the extreme, an acquiring rm with corporate control
might decide not to sell the acquired rms product even if joint prot and welfare
would be higher if it did.2 The intuition for this result is that an acquiring rm that
has only a small nancial interest in the acquired rm achieves the benets from
reduced competition when the latter charges high prices but pays only a fraction
of the costs of the reduced prot in the acquired rm. There is thus a free-rider
problem because the acquired rm earns less prot than it would earn otherwise.
Missing fromOBrien and Salops analysis is a discussion of whether such arrange-
ments might arise in equilibrium. The ownership structure is assumed to be exoge-
nous. In this paper, we follow OBrien and Salops lead by looking at partial own-
ership arrangements in which the acquiring rm obtains corporate control in the
acquired rm but we di¤er in that we endogenize the ownership stake that maxi-
mizes the joint prots of the two rms. Moreover, we introduce a third competitor
external to the two rms involved in the acquisition.
The introduction of an external competitor is key to our results. If there are
only two rms in the market, a merger necessarily maximizes joint prot, as this
1Reynolds and Snapp (1986) and Bresnahan and Salop (1986) were the among the rst to
consider partial ownership arrangements. In models with Cournot competition, they show that
the e¤ects of partial ownership depend critically on whether corporate control is transferred to the
acquiring rm. See also Flath (1989; 1991), Malueg (1992), Reitman (1994), and Gilo et al (2006).
2This is formally shown by Nye (1992) in a model with Cournot competition.
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leads to the monopoly outcome. When there is an external competitor, however,
the monopoly outcome cannot be obtained. In this case, the joint prot of the
acquiring and the acquired rm can actually be higher under a partial ownership
arrangement, and the reason is that a partial ownership arrangement can lead to a
greater dampening of competition when the rmschoices are strategic complements.
We have in mind a setting in which three rms are each producing a substi-
tute good and simultaneously setting prices, resulting in a di¤erentiated-products
Bertrand equilibrium. When rm 1 acquires a controlling stake in rm 2, it has the
power to set rm 2s price in addition to its own price. In the case of a merger,
rm 1 fully internalizes the substitution between goods 1 and 2 and thus raises both
prices relative to the competitive benchmark. Nevertheless, it sets the price of good
2 lower than what it would charge if it only had a partial ownership stake in rm 2.
This is because in a partial ownership arrangement, rm 1 does not fully bear the
costs of substitution away from good 2 when it increases the price on good 2. Firm
3 anticipates the e¤ect of the ownership structure between rms 1 and 2, which
becomes a coordinating signal on prices, and thus keeps its own price higher as well.
The main result of the paper is that, if the impact on the price of rm 3 is
decreasing in the percentage of the shares acquired, the joint prot of rms 1 and 2
will be higher in the case of partial ownership compared to a merger. We consider the
e¤ect on the rmsjoint prot because when the acquiring rm decides the ownership
stake that maximizes the sum of its own prot and that of the acquired rm, it can
make an o¤er for the shares in the acquired rm such that the shareholders in both
rms are better o¤. Hence, even if the operating prot in the acquired rm were to
fall, the shareholders could be compensated through the o¤er made by the acquiring
rm. Thus, there need not be a free-riding problem, unlike in OBrien and Salop.
This result depends crucially upon the negative e¤ect on the price of good 2,
and therefore on the price of good 3, as the percentage of acquired shares increases.
Partial ownership can thus be viewed as a commitment device that can be used to
a¤ect the external competitors pricing behavior. This principle of using the nancial
and corporate structure of a rm as a commitment device in order to a¤ect rival
rmsproduct-market behavior is quite general, and the model structure relates to
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the seminal paper on strategic delegation by Fershtman and Judd (1987).3
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Before presenting the formal model we
provide an example from the pay-tv market in Scandinavia. In section 2 we set-up
the model and derive preliminary results. We then provide an example in section 3
using a Salop circle model of demand to show that a partial ownership arrangement
can be optimal and indeed is always optimal in the example. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 The market for pay-TV in Scandinavia - an example
To illustrate the potential impact that partial ownership arrangements can have on
prices, consider the markets for pay-TV in Norway and Sweden. Demand and supply
conditions in these markets are similar along many dimensions. In both countries,
there are two providers that o¤er pay-TV-subscriptions via satellite (Canal Digi-
tal and Viasat), and for the majority of households, the only viable alternative to
satellite subscription is the digital terrestrial platform (DTT). Within this platform,
there is only one rm in each country (RTV in Norway and Boxer in Sweden).
However, despite these similarities, the price pictures in Norway and Sweden
di¤er markedly, as illustrated in Table 1. First, we see that the subscription fee
for RTV is signicantly higher than for Boxer (only a small portion of the price
di¤erence can be explained by the generally higher price level in Norway compared
to Sweden). Second, we see that Canal Digital charges a lower price than its DTT
competitor in Norway but a higher price than its DTT competitor in Sweden.4
It is not surprising that Canal Digital (and Viasat) has a higher subscription fee
than does Swedens Boxer. Indeed, this is consistent with the widespread view that
a large fraction of the customers in Sweden consider the DTT platform as inferior to
the satellite platform.5 But why, then, is RTV more expensive than Canal Digital
in Norway? And why is DTT so much more expensive in Norway than in Sweden?
3Brander and Lewis (1986) analyze how a rm may choose its nancial structure (degree of
debt) as a credible commitment to engage in aggressive product-market behavior under Cournot
competition. Showalter (1995) analyzes the choice of debt as a commitment device to nonaggressive
behavior under entry accommodation and price competition (see Tirole (2006) for an overview).
4A similar pattern holds for the prices charged by Viasat relative to RTV and Boxer.
5The reason is that DTT faces stricter capacity limits, which reduces the number of channels
that may be provided in premium packages (as well as the ability to provide HDTV-quality).
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1.87$ 210
Relative price CD/BoxerPrice BoxerSweden
0.62$ 490
Relative price CD/RTVPrice RTVNorway
Table 1: Yearly pay-TV prices (subscription fees) in Norway and Sweden.
We suggest that the di¤erence in ownership structures between the two countries
may provide an explanation. Important in this respect is the fact that Boxer is an
independently-owned rm, whereas the Norwegian telecommunications incumbent
Telenor owns 100% of the shares in Canal Digital and 33.3% of the shares in RTV.
Thus, per the discussion above, one can think of Telenor, through its ownership of
Canal Digital, as rm 1 (the acquiring rm) and RTV as rm 2 (the acquired rm).
Let us rst assume (we think erroneously) that Telenor has no corporate control
in RTV, and thus is a passive investor in that company. In this case, one would
expect the nancial interests in RTV will give Telenor an incentive to raise the price
of Canal Digital in Norway relative to Sweden, since some of the prot associated
with reduced sales of Canal Digital in Norway will be recaptured through Telenors
stake in RTV. However, this prediction is inconsistent with the above observation,
since we then should expect the price for satellite access to be relatively higher
than for DTT access in Norway compared to Sweden. Neither can Telenors partial
nancial interest in RTV explain why RTV charges a much higher price than Boxer.
The assumption that Telenor is a passive investor in RTV also does not seem
likely to hold because the other two shareholders in RTV, NRK and TV2, the largest
broadcasters in Norway, have no experience with operating distribution platforms.
This suggests that Telenor to a large extent will likely be able to control RTVs
competitive decision making, including pricing decisions. At the outset one might
think that NRK and TV2 would be unwilling to let Telenor have corporate control,
since Telenor also owns the competitor Canal Digital. However, as we show below
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and this is another main point of our analysis it is precisely in such a situation
that it might be suboptimal for NRK and TV2 to ght for corporate control.
Suppose, therefore, that Telenor has corporate control in RTV as well as in
Canal Digital. Then Telenor will have an incentive to increase RTVs price in order
to reduce the competitive pressure on Canal Digital. If Telenor owned 100% of the
shares in both companies, Telenor would induce RTV and Canal Digital to set the
same (high) prices, other things being equal. However, since Telenor only has 33% of
the shares in RTV, it will have incentives to set a higher price for the services o¤ered
by RTV than for the services o¤ered by Canal Digital in Norway (c.f Proposition 2
below). This might be true even if consumption of the former has a lower perceived
quality. Our model can therefore shed some light on the price patterns in Table 1.
By its very nature, we cannot directly compare the actual outcome in Scandinavia
with a counterfactual case where Telenor has a larger partial nancial interest in
RTV. However, the digital terrestrial platform was established in 2007, and prior
to this the analogue terrestrial platform was the only alternative to direct-to-home
satellite access for the majority of households. The analogue terrestrial platform in
Norway was owned by Telenor. Hence, when this platform was replaced with the
digital terrestrial platform, Telenors nancial stake in the only alternative to the
satellite platform was signicantly reduced. Consistent with our model, the data
reveals that subsequent to the introduction of the DTT platform in Norway, Canal
Digital reduced its prices, and has become relatively more aggressive than Viasat.6
2 The model and preliminary results
There are three rms in the market. Each produces an imperfect substitute. We
focus on a setting in which one rm acquires an ownership stake in a rival. Without
6 The case at hand also has similarities with the BSkyB/ITV merger case in the UK. In 2006,
the largest pay-TV provider, BSkyB, announced that it had acquired 17.9 per cent of shares in
ITV. The UK Competition Commission (2007) concluded that at this level of ownership stake, the
transaction would give BSkyB a signicant degree of corporate control in ITV. The Commissions
view was that BSkyB would have an incentive and ability to weaken the competitive constraint
ITV had on BSkyB. The Commission felt that BSkyBs shareholding in ITV should be reduced
below 7.5%, since this would then restrict the BSkyBs ability to have corporate control in ITV.
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loss of generality, let rm 1 be the acquiring rm, rm 2 be the acquisition target,
and rm 3 be the outside rm, whose response to the acquisition will be crucial.
To focus on the e¤ects of market power in this market, we assume there are
no realized cost savings as a result of the acquisition. We also assume that rms
compete by simultaneously choosing prices. Let i(p) denote rm is prot as a
function of the vector of prices, p, where p = (p1; p2; p3), and pi denotes rm is
price. Let   1 denote the ownership stake in rm 2 that is acquired by rm 1.
We now make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: For any acquisition, there exists  > 0 such that for all  2 [; 1],
rm 1 will obtain corporate control over rm 2, meaning that it will control not only
its own pricing decision but also the pricing decision for good 2.
We allow for a wide range of  in what follows. In practice, rm 1 would clearly
have corporate control if  > 1=2. But, in some cases, it might also have corporate
control even if   1=2, as we suggest may be the case in the pay-TV market in
Norway (see also the UK Competition Commissions views in footnote 6). For 
su¢ ciently small, however, assuming corporate control is likely to be unrealistic.
The game is played in two stages. At stage 1, rm 1 decides on what ownership
share  to acquire, and at stage 2, assuming rm 1 has chosen   , rm 1 decides
on p1 and p2, and rm 3 decides on p3. The solution in stage 2 is thus given by
fp1; p2g = argmax 1(p) + 2(p); (1)
p3 = argmax 3(p): (2)
We assume that prots are continuous and di¤erentiable, and that all second-order
conditions are satised. We further make the standard assumption that own-pricing
e¤ects dominate cross-pricing e¤ects, and that pricing decisions are strategic com-
plements (a la Bulow et al, 1985), i.e., that reaction functions are upward sloping.7
With these assumptions, we obtain the following comparative-static result.
7More formally, let 
12(p; )  1(p) + 2(p). Then, for all   1 and i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j, we
assume @2
12=@p21 < 0, @
2
12=@pi@pj > 0, @2
12=@p22 < 0, @
23=@p
2
3 < 0, and @
23=@p3@pi > 0.
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Proposition 1 Suppose goods 1 and 2 are symmetrically di¤erentiated and have
identical costs of production. Fix rm 3s price at p3. For  su¢ ciently close to
zero, rm 1 will optimally set p2 such that q2 = 0: For  su¢ ciently close to one, rm
1s will optimally set p1, p2 such that q1, q2 > 0, with dp1=d > 0 and dp2=d < 0.
Proof : See the appendix.
Proposition 1 o¤ers insight into how rm 1s prot-maximizing prices will vary
as a function of . Intuitively, since the goods are substitutes, demand for good
1 is decreasing in output of good 2 (and vice versa). If rm 1 owns a very small
share of rm 2, it will thus nd it optimal to maximize the protability of good 1 by
not selling good 2 at all (see also Nye, 1992, and OBrien and Salop, 2000); q2 = 0.
However, this does not maximize aggregate prots 1 + 2 if the two goods are
imperfect substitutes. Firm 1 will therefore optimally reduce the price of good 2
to ensure that q2 > 0 if it owns a su¢ ciently large share of rm 2. This explains
why dp2=d < 0; as it will put more weight on 2 the higher is : Or, to phrase
it di¤erently, the higher is rm 1s share of ownership in rm 2, the more rm 1
internalizes the negative e¤ects on rm 2s prot of setting an articially high p2.
Since 2 is increasing in p1, it further follows that, other things being equal, rm 1
should set a higher price on good 1 the more it owns of rm 2, i.e., dp1=d > 0.8
The net implication of these ndings is that by acquiring less than 100% of rm
2, rm 1 can credibly commit to setting a higher p2 than what would maximize rm
1 and 2s joint prot for any given p3. Whether, and under what circumstances, this
will induce less aggressive behavior from rm 3 is the main question we address.
2.1 The trade-o¤ of partial ownership
A trade-o¤ arises if the commitment to a higher p2 (that is brought about by the
partial ownership arrangement) would induce less aggressive behavior on the part
8For completeness, it should be noted that p1 need not be monotonically increasing in : To
see why, consider the critical value of ;   0; at which it becomes optimal for rm 1 to sell a
positive quantity of good 2. The fact that the goods are substitutes then implies that demand for
good 1 falls. This will in general induce rm 1 to reduce the price on good 1. We should therefore
expect p1 to be a U-shaped function of ; with dp1=dj=0 < 0 and dp1=dj=1 > 0:
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of rm 3. On the one hand, the favorable response by rm 3 would benet rms 1
and 2. On the other hand, the higher p2 by denition is an upward distortion from
that which would maximize the joint prot of rms 1 and 2 all else being equal.
To capture the essence of this trade-o¤, we now allow p3 to vary and let p1(),
p2(), and p

3() denote the equilibrium prices as a function of . We want to know
whether the maximization of rm 1 and 2s prot occurs at  = 1, as is implicitly
assumed in the merger literature, or whether it occurs at some  < 1. Thus, consider
max

1(p

1(); p

2(); p

3()) + 2(p

1(); p

2(); p

3());
which yields the following rst-order condition
@1
@p1
+
@2
@p1

dp1
d
+

@1
@p2
+
@2
@p2

dp2
d
+

@1
@p3
+
@2
@p3

dp3
d
: (3)
Substituting the rst-order conditions from the pricing game, (3) reduces to
(1  )

@2
@p1
dp1
d
+
@2
@p2
dp2
d

+

@1
@p3
+
@2
@p3

dp3
d
: (4)
Suppose for the moment that rm 3s price is independent of , so that dp

3
d
= 0
for all   1. Then, it follows immediately from (4) that  = 1 is a local maximum.
And, indeed, it is also a global maximum, as rm 1 obviously cannot do any better
than to acquire all of rm 2 in this case. Thus, if a partial ownership arrangement
is to increase the joint prot of rms 1 and 2 compared to a merger, it must be
because the arrangement induces a favorable response by the outside rm, rm 3.
A favorable response occurs if rm 3s price is decreasing in rm 1s ownership
share of rm 2 when evaluated at  = 1. Or, in other words, a favorable response
occurs if rm 1s acquisition of the last bit of rm 2 would cause rm 3 to respond
by reducing its price. In this case, it cannot be protable for rm 1 to acquire all of
rm 2 (formally, the rst-order condition in (4) would be negative when evaluated
at  = 1 if dp

3
d
j=1 < 0). Note further that even if dp

3
d
= 0 at  = 1, so that  = 1 is
a local maximum, it need not be a global maximum.9 We have the following result:
9This is the case, for example, for the Hotelling demands that we consider in the next section.
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Proposition 2 A su¢ cient condition for a partial-ownership arrangement to be
more protable than a merger is that dp

3
d
j=1 < 0. A necessary condition for such
an arrangement to be more protable than a merger is that dp

3
d
< 0 for some   1.
Proposition 2 contains the main result of the paper. It gives necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for the joint prot of rms 1 and 2 to be higher under a partial-
ownership arrangement than under a merger. Partial-ownership arrangements can
be viewed as a commitment device to a¤ect the outside rms pricing behavior. From
the related literature on strategic delegation (see, e.g., Fershtman and Judd, 1987,
and Bonanno and Vickers, 1988), it is well known that the outcome of this com-
mitment depends crucially on whether the rmschoices are strategic complements
or substitutes. When they are strategic complements, any commitment to become
less aggressive (here a partial acquisition, instead of a merger) helps the rms coor-
dinate towards a more collusive outcome. If the rmschoices are instead strategic
substitutes (e.g., the rms compete in quantities and have downward-sloping reac-
tion functions), it is straightforward to show that absent signicant cost savings,
a partial-ownership arrangement would not be protable in a market with three
rms.10
Similar necessary and su¢ cient conditions would arise if rm 1, instead of choos-
ing  to maximize its joint prot with rm 2, were to choose  to maximize the prot
that it could expect to earn in stage 2, 1 + 2. Although the rst multiplicative
term in equation (4) would then be zero, the second term would be unchanged, and
thus so would the su¢ ciency condition in Proposition 2. In this and the previous
case, knowing how rm 1s acquisition of shares in rm 2 a¤ects rm 3s price at
the margin is the key to determining which ownership structure is more protable.
In what follows, we assume that rm 1 solves for the ownership share  that
would maximize the joint prot of rms 1 and 2 in stage 2. The reason is that in
practice, rm 1 will have to buy its shares before the stage 2 game is actually played.
One way to do this is to o¤er to buy  of the shares from each of rm 2s owners.
10Relatedly, Salant et al. (1983) were the rst to show that a merger between two rms would
also not be protable in this setting when quantities are strategic substitutes. The reason is that
the merger would cause the third rm to expand its output to the detriment of the merging rms.
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By choosing the ownership share that maximizes joint prot, rm 1 is thus assured
of being able to make a protable o¤er that all of rm 2s owners would accept.11
Since we would normally expect rm 1s price to be increasing in its ownership
share of rm 2, and conversely, rm 2s price to be decreasing as rm 1 owns more
of rm 2, we need to use a more specied model of demand to determine the net
e¤ect on rm 3s price of an increase in . This is the subject of the next section,
where we show that in a model of demand in which consumers are located around
a unit circle, the e¤ect of the increase in rm 2s price outweighs the e¤ect of the
decrease in rm 1s price, such that rm 1 never wants to fully merge with rm 2.
3 Salop circle model of demand
We consider a circular city model a-la Salop (1979) with a uniform distribution of
consumers, a perimeter of 1, and a unitary density of consumers around the circle.12
The rms are located equidistantly from each other, and for simplicity all marginal
and xed costs are set to zero. Throughout we restrict our analysis to outcomes
with full market coverage (all consumers buy from one of the rms) and in which
all three rms are active in the market. We assume quadratic transportation costs
such that the location of a consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from rm i
and j is given by tx2 + pi = t
 
1
3
  x2   pj.13 This yields the following demands:
qi(p) =
1
3
  32pi   (pj + pk)
2t
; (5)
11This allocation procedure is consistent with U.S. regulations for acquisitions. A takeover
process usually starts with a tender o¤er (an invitation to buy a part or all of the shares of a rm
at an announced price). The o¤er may be conditional on a given number of shares being tendered,
such that the bidder may obtain corporate control. According to U.S. regulations, a bidder that
provides an o¤er to buy less than 100% of the shares of a rm must accept shares tendered on
a pro-rated basis (see e.g., Hunt, 2009, page 524). As an example, consider a partial-ownership
structure in which one rm o¤ers to buy 30% of the shares of another rm. If all shareholders
accept the o¤er, the bidder is obligated under the law to buy 30% of all the shareholdersstocks.
12The Hotelling and Salop frameworks have become the standard tools for analyzing media
economics, see e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005), Gabszewicz et al (2004) and Peitz and Valletti
(2008). One reason for this is that unitary demand seems reasonable in the media industry (people
watch either zero or one TV channel at any given time, or choose either cable or satellite, etc).
13In this section linear transportation costs would yield the same outcome. Nevertheless, we use
quadratic transportation costs because, in section 3.2, we also consider asymmetric locations.
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where i; j; k = 1; 2; 3, i 6= j 6= k; and p = (p1; p2; p3) is the vector of prices.
Given that rm 1 has corporate control over rm 2 (c.f. Assumption 1), the
solution to the last stage of the game is given by
fp1; p2g = argmax p1q1(p)| {z }
1
+ p2q2(p)| {z }
2
; (6)
p3 = argmax p3q3(p): (7)
Solving the rst-order conditions from (6) and (7) yield the stage 2 reaction functions
p1 =
t
18
+ (1 + )
p2
4
+
p3
4
;
p2 =
t
18
+

1 + 


p1
4
+
p3
4
;
p3 =
t
18
+
p1 + p2
4
;
from which it follows that @p1=@ = p2=4 > 0 and @p2=@ =  p1=
 
42

< 0: The
price charged by rm 3 depends on  indirectly, through the rivalsprices p1 and p2.
Solving the three reaction functions simultaneously yields equilibrium prices
p1 =
10 (5 + ) t
9D
; p2 =
10(1 + 5)t
9D
; and p3 =
16t
3D
; (8)
where D = 36   5(1  )2 is strictly positive in the relevant area (see below).
If rms 1 and 2 merge, rm 1 will fully internalize the fact that a higher price
on good 1 increases demand for good 2, and vice versa. In this case, it follows from
(8) that p1 = p

2 = 5t=27 > p

3 = 4t=27: However, if rm 1 does not purchase all of
rm 2s shares, its incentive will be to increase the price of good 2 above 5t=27 in
order to earn a higher prot on good 1. By acquiring less than 100% of rm 2, rm
1 thus gives a credible signal to rm 3 that it will charge a higher price on good 2.
This tends to increase rm 3s price, such that both dp2=d < 0 and dp

3=d < 0.
The e¤ect on rm 1s price, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, the
strategic complementarity among prices suggests that rm 1s price will also be
decreasing in . On the other hand, all else being equal, rm 1 is more inclined to
set a higher price on good 1 to boost demand for good 2 the larger is its nancial
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interests in rm 2 (c.f. Proposition 1). This e¤ect goes in the opposite direction
of strategic complementarity. On net, the equilibrium prices in (8) suggest that
dp1=d > 0 if and only if  > 0:66.
Substituting the prices in (8) into (5) yields q2(p) = 5 (3   1) =D: If  is suf-
ciently small, rm 1s incentive is to set p2 such that rm 2 will face no demand
(see footnote 7). Hence, to ensure that q2(p)  0 (and also that D > 0), we assume
  1
3
:
With this assumption, equilibrium prots for the three rms are given by
2 =
50t (1 + 5) (3   1)
9D2
; (9)
1 =
50t (3  ) (5 + ) 2
9D2
; and 3 =
256t2
3D2
; (10)
where i denotes rm is equilibrium prot. It is straightforward to show from (9)
that 2 is increasing in ; while 

1 and 

3 are decreasing in .
The fact that d3=d < 0 raises the question of whether rm 3 would want to
oppose rm 1s acquisition of shares in rm 2, i.e. whether 3 is highest for  = 0.
The answer is no; it can be shown that if all rms are independent, each will make
prots equal to i = t=27: Using equation (10), we then nd that 3  i > 0 in the
relevant area.14 It is thus protable for rm 3 that rm 1 acquires corporate control
over rm 2, but it would like the share acquisition to be as small as possible. The
intuition is simply that the smaller is ; the lower will be the aggregate output from
rms 1 and 2 (and with q2 = 0 for su¢ ciently low values of ; c.f. Proposition 1).
At stage 1, rm 1 chooses how much of rm 2 to acquire in order to maximize its
joint prot with rm 2 given the anticipated equilibrium stage 2 prices. Summing
1 and 

2 we have
1 + 

2 =
25t
81

1 + (1  )2 [36   79(1  )
2]
D2

: (11)
14Calculations show that 3   i = t
 
2 + 52 + 5
  
94   52   5 =(27D2) > 0 for  > 0:05;
and thus also in the relevant area  2 [1=3; 1]
12
It follows immediately that partial ownership of rm 2 is more protable for rms
1 and 2 than full ownership as long as 36 > 79(1 )2; i.e. as long as  > e  0:52.
Solving for the acquisition share that maximizes the two rmsjoint prot yields15
 = 1  6
p
2  2
17
 0:619: (12)
Proposition 3 A partial-ownership arrangement is more protable for rms 1 and
2 than a merger for all  2 [e; 1). Their joint prot is maximized at  = :
The key to this result is the e¤ect an increase in ownership has on the price of
rm 3s product. Since dp3=d < 0, it follows that relative to the case of a merger
between rms 1 and 2, rm 3s price will be higher when rm 1 does not own all
of rm 2 but nevertheless has corporate control. A higher price on rm 3s product
benets rms 1 and 2, and this benet is enough to more than o¤set the gain rms
1 and 2 could have achieved by merging and thereby fully coordinating their prices.
Substituting the joint-prot maximizing ownership share,  = , into the equi-
librium prices in (8) yields the following comparative-static result on rm prices:
Proposition 4 At the optimal ownership share  = , rm 1 sets a lower price
on good 1 and a higher price on good 2, and rm 3 sets a higher price on good 3,
relative to the prices that would have arisen had rms 1 and 2 merged instead.
The results in this section have some important implications for competition
policy, namely that a partial-ownership arrangement in which  =  < 1 makes
consumers in aggregate worse o¤ than they would have been if the rms had merged.
The reason for this is that the partial ownership serves as a commitment device to
credibly soften competition. Furthermore, within the context of the Salop circle
model of demand, there will be also a welfare loss due to the fact that the average
transportation costs are higher under a partial-ownership arrangement than under a
merger. However, not all consumers are worse o¤. Consumers that would buy from
rm 1 also under a merger would benet from the partial-ownership arrangement.
15See our earlier discussion on why rm 1 chooses  to maximize 1 + 2 rather than 1 + 2.
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3.1 Fight for corporate control
We have shown that it is optimal for rm 1 to stop short of a merger under the
assumption that it will still control all pricing decisions (Assumption 1). Therefore,
two important questions are: how reasonable is this assumption, and will the owners
of the remaining shares have an incentive to try to wrest this control from rm 1?
To investigate these questions, assume that rm 2 at the outset is owned by one
shareholder, and that without the acquisition, she would have corporate control in
rm 2. She will then accept the o¤er from rm 1 at stage 1 if the sum of what she
is paid at stage 1 for a fraction  of the shares in rm 2 and the residual stage
2 operating prot of rm 2, (1   )2, is higher than what she would achieve if
she does not accept rm 1s o¤er and rm 2 continues to operate as separate rm.
However, after the acquisition is completed, the residual owner of rm 2 will have
an incentive to try to recapture corporate control if this increases the rms stage 2
operating prot. Having such incentives clearly does not necessarily mean that she
will succeed, but partial acquisition of rm 2 might be more appealing to rm 1 if
the residual owner does not have such incentives. In this subsection, we consider
whether and under what conditions rm 1 can expect a subsequent ght for control.
Assume for now that the residual owners are able to wrest corporate control of
rm 2s pricing decision. Then the stage 2 maximization problems are as follows:
max
p1
= p1q1(p) + p2q2(p);
max
p2
= (1  ) p2q2(p);
max
p3
= p3q3(p):
Solving for the equilibrium prices yields
p1 =
2t(5 + )
9(10  )  p2 = p3 =
10t
9 (10  ) :
Substituting these prices into the total operating prot from selling good 2 yields
~2 =
100t
27 (10  )2 : (13)
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The operating prot of rm 2 when rm 1 has corporate control is given by (9).
Comparing the operating prot of rm 2 with and without the transfer of corporate
control to rm 1 yields the following result.
Proposition 5 The non-rm 1 owners have no incentive to ght ex-post for the
corporate control of the pricing decision on good 2 if  2 [b; 1), where b  0:623:
This result is illustrated in Figure 1 below, where the broken line shows the value
of rm 2 when rm 1 has corporate control (given by (9)) and the solid line shows
the value of rm 2 when rm 1 does not have corporate control (given by (13)). The
residual owners of rm 2, i.e., those that control 1  of the shares in rm 2, have no
incentive to wrest corporate control over rm 2 from rm 1 if   b. The residual
owners of rm 2 have an incentive (but no ability) to wrest corporate control over
rm 2 from rm 1 if 1=2   < b. And, nally, the residual owners of rm 2 have
an incentive (and possibly the ability) to wrest corporate control over rm 2 from
rm 1 if  < 1=2.16 In this section we have that  > 1=2, and we expect that the
acquiring rm has corporate control even if  > b. However, in the next section we
allow for asymmetric location of the rms on the Salop-circle. We then show that
we may have  < 1=2.
16In this case, although the incentive may be there, rm 1 has a majority stake and need usually
not worry about having control wrested from it. Note, however, that in presence of non-voting
shares, we may have a situation where even a majority stake is not su¢ cient to have corporate
control.
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Figure 1: Firm 1s ownership share and the possibility of a ght for corporate
control.
3.2 Asymmetric location
We have assumed that the rms were symmetrically located along the Salop circle.
Suppose instead, as in Figure 2, that the distance between rms 1 and 2 is y; and
the distance between rms 2 and 3 and 1 and 3 is (1  y) =2: Then, assuming all
rms are active and there is complete market coverage, we have for i, j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
qi(p) =
1 + y
4
  pi (1 + y)  pj (1  y)  2yp3
2ty (1  y) and q3(p) =
1  y
2
  2p3   (pi + pj)
t (1  y) :
(14)
16
#1 #2
y
(1-y)/2(1-y)/2
#3
Figure 2: Asymmetric localization.
Under the assumption that rm 1 has control over both its own and rm 2s
pricing decisions, the stage 2 equilibrium prices are given by
p1 =
 (4  (1  y)(1  ))
2Dy (3 + y)
 1 (1  y) 1 ty; p2 =
4  (1  ) (y + 3)
2Dy (3 + y)
 1 (1  y) 1 ty; (15)
and
p3 =
8y (3  y)    (1  )2 (1  3y) (1  y)
4Dy
t (1  y) ; (16)
where the denominator Dy is given by Dy  24y   (1  )2 (1  y) (2  y) :
Using equations (15) and (16), prots for the three rms can be expressed as
1 =
ty2 (1 + 3y    (1  y)) (3 + y   (1  y))
4D2y (3 + y)
 2 (1  y) 1 ;
2 =
((1  3y)  y) ((1  )y   3   1) yt
4D2y (3 + y)
 2 (1  y) 1 ;
and
3 =
t ((1  )2 (1  3y) (1  y)  8y (3  y))2 (1  y)
8D2y
:
At stage 1, rm 1 chooses  to solve max (1 + 2) ; which yields
(y) = 1 for y  1=5;
(y) = 1  4y (1  5y) + 2
p
2y (5y   1) (1 + y) (6  3y2 + y)
3 (1  y) (y2 + 5y + 2) for y  1=5:
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Intuitively, for y  1=5, goods 1 and 2 are such close substitutes that rm 1 prefers
to merge with rm 2. Otherwise, rm 1 prefers to acquire only a fraction of rm 2,
the less so the greater is y. This is illustrated by the solid curve in Figure 3.
If the residual owners of rm 2 acquire corporate control in rm 2, we nd that
2 =
(1  y2) (y + 3)4 yt
8 (6 + 17y   2   3(1  )y + 3y2 + (1  )y2)2 :
The dotted curve C(y) in Figure 3 shows the combinations of y and  where the
residual owners of rm 2 are just indi¤erent to ghting for corporate control. If rm
1s share is less than C(y), these owners will ght for control, but will otherwise
prefer that control rest with rm 1. By choosing  = C(y) for y > y#  0:32 and
 = (y) for y < y#; rm 1 can thus avoid a struggle for corporate control:
We can summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 6 As long as goods 1 and 2 are su¢ ciently close substitutes (y  1=5),
rm 1 prefers to merge with rm 2. Otherwise, for all y > 1=5, rm 1 prefers to
acquire only a fraction of rm 2 and thus a partial-ownership arrangement is optimal.
Figure 3: Asymmetric location; corporate and nancial control.
With symmetric locations, we found that  was greater than 1=2; such that the
acquiring rm did not need to worry that the residual owners of rm 2 might try
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to wrest corporate control. However, the possibility that aggregate prots for rms
1 and 2 are maximized for ownership-shares lower than 1=2 might arise if the rms
are asymmetrically located, as is clear from Figure 3. Suppose, for instance, that
y ! 1=2. We then nd that  = 0:41, while C = 0:504. Thus, if the acquiring rm
buys only the number of shares that maximizes aggregate prots, , the residual
owners of rm 2 will have an incentive to ght for corporate control. To avoid this,
the acquiring rm may instead prefer to choose an ownership share greater than .
4 Conclusion
The competitive e¤ects of a merger between two rms are well understood. Two
rms that previously were independent are able to coordinate their output and pric-
ing decisions by merging. In the case where the rms produce substitute products,
this leads them in the absence of cost savings to charge higher prices and/or to
cut back on their outputs. It is well known, however, that this e¤ect can be trumped
if rival rms in the market are thereby induced to become more aggressive (see Salant
et al, 1983). Hence, much of the literature on the protability of mergers turns on
whether the merger would induce rival rms to become more or less aggressive.
Our starting point is a situation in which the merger would induce rival rms to
become less aggressive. This presumably is a best-case scenario for a merger to be
protable, as the dampening-of-competition e¤ect seemingly works in the mergers
favor. Nevertheless, we have shown in this paper that a merger (in the usual sense of
acquiring 100% nancial interest in a rival) may not be the optimal strategy for the
would-be merging rms. Instead, we have shown that the joint prot of the acquiring
rm and the acquired rm can be higher if the acquiring rm purchases less than
100% of the shares in the acquired rm. Although this results in pricing and output
distortions that disadvantage it relative to the prot a merged rm would earn all
else being equal, the distortions can in some cases lead to a further dampening of
competition -which may more than o¤set the original loss due to the distortions.
We can extend our analysis of partial acquisitions to a dual setting; when would
a cross-majority owner have incentives to sell a fraction of the shares in one of
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the rms he controls to a silent investor who is outside the industry? As we have
shown with partial acquisitions, such partial divestitures may be protable under
price competition. Since the joint prot of the rms that are controlled by the
cross-majority shareholder increases in this case, the cross-majority shareholder and
the silent investor will be better o¤ with than without the partial divestiture. This
has implications for competition policy. Consider a case in which two out of three
rms in a market are owned by one stakeholder. Should competition authorities
intervene if the owner wants to sell say 30% of the shares of one of these rms to a
passive investor? Our analysis suggests that this could worsen competition. By the
same token, assume that competition authorities would allow a merger between two
out of three rms in a market (perhaps due to anticipated e¢ ciency gains). If the
acquiring rm wants to buy say 70% of the shares in the acquired rm instead of
all the shares, should the competition authorities require it to buy all the shares?
To our knowledge, this paper is the rst to look at the protability of partial-
ownership arrangements when the acquiring rm obtains corporate control. There is
no doubt much scope for future work. Because general results are di¢ cult to obtain
with di¤erentiated products, one avenue for future research is to assess whether
and to what extent the results presented here may hold in other demand contexts
(e.g., in models with vertical as well as horizontal product di¤erentiation). It may
also be fruitful to look at the e¤ects of agency relationships, in which the acquiring
rm hires an agent to carry out its instructions. In these settings, one could then
relax the assumption that corporate control is an all or nothing proposition. One
might expect the optimal contract in this case (assuming it is publicly observed) to
incentivize the agent to give fractional weights to the interests of both the acquiring
and the acquired rm when setting prices, which can lead to a much richer analysis.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Given p3; let (p01; p
0
2) denote rm 1s price pair which
maximizes 1+2 subject to q2 = 0; i.e. rm 1s optimal price on good 1 given that
it sets p2 such that q2 = 0: If rm 1 marginally reduces the price of good 2 from p02; it
will loose @1 (p01; p
0
2) =( @p2) in prots from good 1 and gain 2 (p01; p02) =( @p2)
in prots from rm 2. If @1 (p01; p
0) =( @p2) + 2 (p01; p02) =( @p2) < 0; it will not
be optimal to set p2 < p02: This implicitly denes a critical value   0  0 such
that (p1; p2) = (p01; p
0
2) is a prot maximizing price pair if   0:
If  > 0, the prot-maximizing p1 and p2 are given by the simultaneous solution
to the rst-order conditions
@1
@p1
+ 
@2
@p1
= 0; (17)
@1
@p2
+ 
@2
@p2
= 0: (18)
Totally di¤erentiating this yields0@ Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
1A0@ dp1
dp2
1A =
0@  @2@p1
 @2
@p2
1A d;
where
Z11 =
@21
@p21
+ 
@22
@p21
; Z12 =
@21
@p1@p2
+ 
@22
@p1@p2
;
Z21 =
@21
@p2@p1
+ 
@22
@p2@p1
; Z22 =
@21
@p22
+ 
@22
@p22
:
This yields
dp1
d
=
 @2
@p1
Z22 +
@2
@p2
Z12
Z11Z22   Z12Z21 ;
dp2
d
=
 @2
@p2
Z11 +
@2
@p1
Z21
Z11Z22   Z12Z21 :
Our assumptions imply Zii < 0, Zij > 0, and jZiij > Zij, and since @2@p2 =  @2@p1 un-
der symmetry when  = 1, it follows that dp1
d
> 0 and dp2
d
< 0 as in the Proposition.
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